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To mitigate adverse effects on ranchers from reduced access to public forage, financial or 
other forms of ‘compensation’ may be required. In this paper, we use results from a survey of 
Nevada ranchers to examine ranchers’ willingness to sell grazing permits and participate in 
other schemes that enable them to continue ranching in spite of declining access to public 
forage. On average ranchers demand $255 per AUM to sell grazing permits, while support 
for other programs, some of which are performance based, depends on whether respondents 
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Ranchers have increasingly come under pressure from environmental groups because 
livestock grazing on public lands is seen to be a contributing factor to environmental 
degradation. Access to public grazing has fallen over time, threatening the viability of 
ranchers’ operations. For example, public grazing in Nevada decreased by 32.7% (or some 
540,000 AUMs) between 1981 and 2002, resulting in estimated direct annual losses of more 
than $12 million to the livestock industry and $25 million to the Nevada economy (Resource 
Concepts Inc.). To address the external impacts of livestock grazing on public lands, 
Congress is considering compensating ranchers for loss of grazing services, primarily by 
purchasing ranchers’ grazing permits. Under the proposed Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout 
Act (HR 3324, 16 October 2003), for example, Congress would have made available $100 
million to purchase grazing permits from ranchers for an offered price of $175 per AUM. 
Such legislation has not yet been passed, however, partly because rural lobby groups oppose 
buyouts as this implies an irrevocable loss of access to public range and a decline in the 
number of ranchers and the rural community, while some environmentalists argue that the 
budget is inadequate to stop the continued deterioration of public lands.  
A pro-ranch view of public land management had ranchers and public land managers 
working together to improve rangeland, until numerous environmental laws enacted in the 
1970s and 1980s led the public land managers to devote less time to building relationships 
with ranchers and more to complying with federal regulations.
1 It considers reductions in 
AUM allocations as a naïve response by public land managers to demands to protect non-
commercial values of the range. While some of the reductions were considered valid due to 
  1evidence of deteriorating range quality, managers were often viewed as making range 
management decisions based on inadequate information, resulting from too little staffing, 
funding or experience, leading to poor range decisions and systematic AUM reductions;
2 
apparently insufficient time was spent seeking effective solutions to range problems 
(Resource Concepts Inc., pp.62-63). This led to a reduction in the ranch community’s social 
capital (Putnam), particularly as trust between ranchers and the land agents declined. 
Consequently, little has been done cooperatively to resolve grazing problems on public 
range, with little investment in activities that increase social capital and reduce the 
transaction costs of sustainable range management (van Kooten et al.). 
In this paper, we investigate factors that might affect the political acceptability of 
several schemes to compensate ranchers for reduced access to public lands. Among factors 
we consider are ranchers’ opinions about range management and the level of trust that exists 
between ranchers and the public land agencies in Nevada. For this purpose, we employ 
responses to a survey of ranchers, using these to examine various economic and social 
aspects related to the acceptance of alternative grazing options. The options considered 
include sale of all rights to future grazing and several schemes that enable ranchers to 
maintain their incomes and lifestyles despite lost grazing opportunities.  
The survey was mailed to the entire population of BLM and US Forest Service 
grazing permit holders in Nevada between March 29, 2002 and July 5, 2002. The design and 
mailing procedures were based on Dillman. The survey was reviewed and pre-tested by 
various University of Nevada Reno faculty members, Nevada extension specialists and others 
at the university involved in ranching. The first mailing was sent on March 29, 2002 with a 
second mailing to non-respondents on May 21, 2002. Follow-up telephone calls were 
  2subsequently made throughout June to all ranchers who had not responded to either mailing. 
The response rate was 47.9 percent, or 246 completed surveys (Thomsen).
3 
As indicated in table 1, on average respondents owned nearly 9,000 acres of their own 
land and utilized 5,037 AUMs of public grazing. Respondents were predominantly male (206 
of 244), 53 years of age with nearly 38 years of ranching experience (not all as the operator), 
and with slightly more than one year post-secondary education. Annual income from all 
sources averaged about $53,400, with some one-third reportedly coming from off the ranch.
4 
If one compares income, age and levels of education with 2000 Census Data for Elko, White 
Pine, Eureka and Humboldt Counties, those in which the majority of respondents are located, 
no statistical differences between ranchers and other rural residents are discernable.
5 Hence, 
we have no reason to suspect that the exclusion of non-respondents would lead to bias in the 
statistical analyses that follow.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Respondents to the Nevada ranch survey were asked two types of questions dealing 
with potential compensation. First, they were asked to provide a ‘yes’/‘no’ response to a 
proposed payment in exchange for permanently retiring their grazing rights. Then they were 
asked to provide their opinions (on a five-point likert scale) regarding three alternative 
mechanisms that might enable them to mitigate losses from reduced access to grazing. A 
random utility maximization framework is appropriate for analyzing binary (‘yes’/‘no’) 
responses, while an order-logit model is typically used when responses are categorical.  
We begin in the next section by employing the standard random utility maximization 
  3framework to examine ranchers’ stated willingness to accept monetary compensation for 
selling grazing rights. Then, we examine responses to three alternative means of 
compensating ranchers using an ordered-logit model. While the focus of the research is to 
investigate methods for compensating ranchers for loss of grazing privileges, we also 
investigate the impact on compensation of ranchers’ opinions about their relations with the 
public land agencies (trust, levels of disagreements, opinions on the role of livestock grazing, 
etc.) and personal characteristics. Our conclusion is that relations between ranchers and the 
land agencies, and ranchers’ personal situations, have an important impact on compensation 
levels and the design of compensation schemes. 
Compensating Ranchers by Purchase of Grazing Permits 
The 1978 Public Rangelands Improvement Act established that grazing fees would be 
calculated as a base fee of $1.23 per AUM (established in 1966 using a cost of production 
approach). The base fee is adjusted using indexes of private grazing values, livestock market 
prices and rancher operating costs, but with the proviso that the fee not decline below 
$1.35/AUM (Torell et al.; Dietz and Rothenberg). The grazing fee reached a high of 
$2.36/AUM in 1980 falling to $1.35 in 1985, never again to exceed $2 per AUM; the grazing 
fee was $1.43 in 2002 (the year of our survey), falling back to $1.35 in 2003 where it had 
been for most of the previous decade. Private alternatives for grazing averaged $11 per AUM 
in 1997 (Dietz and Rothenberg). In Oregon, private grazing was valued at an average of 
$9.23 per AUM in 2004, and an average $8.83/AUM in the two most southeasterly counties 
in the State, Malheur ($2.53/AUM) and Harney ($12.43/AUM) counties, which border 
Nevada.
6 
  4Based on the 2002 grazing fee and assuming that southern Oregon’s private fee of 
$8.83/AUM includes benefits of $2.91/AUM (or one third of the private fee) not available on 
public range (see Bartlett et al.), the capitalized value of a grazing permit in Nevada amounts 
to some $89.80 per AUM if a discount rate of 5% is employed.
7 This might be considered the 
benefit that continued access to public forage confers upon ranchers.  
Respondents to the Nevada ranch survey were asked whether they would be willing 
to accept a certain level of compensation to retire their grazing rights permanently, an idea 
first proposed by Gardner (1962, 1963). Ranchers were given randomly generated WTA 
amounts ranging from $5 to $200 per AUM, with 8.4% of respondents indicating a 
willingness to accept the stated amount. To determine the average expected compensation 
required, we use the random utility maximization (RUM) framework to depict a rancher’s 
decision about whether or not to accept a particular offer to sell grazing rights.  
RUM Model 
The RUM approach to analyzing dichotomous choice responses to a valuation question is 
well known. We briefly describe it in the context of the current study. Assume rancher i’s 
indirect utility is a function of access to public forage (indicator variable I), income that 
depends on the availability of public forage, m(I), and a vector of observable characteristics 
s. Suppose that the indirect utility function can be specified as having a deterministic 
component, vi(I, m, s), and an additive stochastic component: ui(I, m(I), s) = vi(I, m(I), s) + 
εi,I, where I=1 if the individual wishes to continue to access public forage and 0 otherwise, 
and εi,0 and εi,1 are iid random variables with zero mean and variance σ
2 (Greene).  
When offered an amount of money, B, to forego perpetual access to an annual AUM 
of public forage, rancher i will sell her grazing permit as long as vi(0, m+B, s)+εi,0>vi(1, m, s) 
  5+εi,1. Since utility is a random variable, the probability that a rancher chooses to accept the 
offer can be written as (suppressing subscript i):  
(1) Pr(ywta=yes) = Pr{v (0, m+B, s)+ε0 > v (1, m, s)+ε1}  
      =  Pr  {(ε0 – ε1) > –[v (0, m+B, s) – v (1, m, s)]}.  
Let ∆v=[v(0, m+B, s) – v(1,m, s)]/σ and ε=(ε0 – ε1) /σ, where ε is iid (because ε1 and ε0 are 
iid) and distributed as a logistics function. This yields the logit model: 








= ε  is the cumulative logistics distribution function and ∆v(B, s) = β′ xwta, 
where xwta includes the buyout offer and other attributes.  
The ranchers’ minimum WTA compensation, denoted B
*, is determined as the 
amount of money needed to keep the rancher indifferent between accepting the bid and 
retaining cattle on public land (Hanemann). One can express this indifference by setting the 
probability of accepting a bid to 0.5 and solving for B
*, 
(3)   Pr(a=1) = Pr{ v1(m+B*, s) + ε1 > v0(m, s) + ε0} = 0.5.  
From (3), the probability of accepting the bid, B
*, is the same as the probability of rejecting 
it. Thus, the median willingness to accept compensation can be considered a basic welfare 
measure, which is found by solving (3) for B
*.  
Empirical Results: Ranchers’ Willingness to Accept (WTA) Compensation  
The estimated logit regression equation explaining the WTA compensation for retiring 
  6grazing rights is provided in table 2, as is our estimate of average WTA. A log-likelihood 
ratio test is used to determine whether the variables included in the final (restricted) 
regression model are statistically preferred to those included in the general model, which 
includes all the variables available for explaining acceptance of the WTA amount, namely, 
those provided in table 1.
8 Only the final model results are presented in table 2. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
The WTA variable has a positive coefficient as anticipated, indicating that as the 
WTA payment offer increased the likelihood of a ‘yes’ response also increased. The median 
WTA determined from the results in table 2 is $255.36. This is the compensation demanded 
that would make ranchers indifferent between the bid and staying in ranching, namely, 
Pr(‘yes’)=Pr(‘no’)=0.5. Although the compensation bids in the Nevada ranch survey ranged 
from $5 to $200, the $255 predicted median WTA is above the $90.83 average WTA of the 
8.4 percent of respondents who would take the offered amount. The estimated RUM model 
takes into account the fact that more than 90 percent of respondents are unwilling to accept 
the proposed buyout, which explains why the estimated median and mean levels of 
compensation exceed $200. Nonetheless, given the confidence interval about the estimated 
median, it turns out that the offer of $175 per AUM found in the proposed buyout legislation 
falls within a 95% confidence interval of the estimated median compensation demanded. 
Nonetheless, the high compensation demanded value appears to indicate that ranchers want 
to hold on to their grazing rights and few are likely to accept an offer of $175 per AUM. Yet, 
only a small proportion of ranchers in the western United States need to accept this offer and 
  7the proposed $100 million budget will be exhausted.  
We calculated that grazing permits in Nevada might be worth $89.80/AUM when 
compared to private rates in Oregon and using a 5% discount rate. From the RUM model, we 
estimated that compensation demanded might be some $255, suggesting that ranchers are 
likely using a much lower discount rate than 5% – a crude calculation suggests it is about 
1.7% (see also Bartlett et al.). This is surprising because one would expect the value of a 
grazing permit to be discounted at a much higher rate than even 5%, perhaps in the range of 
20% (which would imply a value of $22.40/AUM), because of uncertainty about ranchers’ 
future ability to access public forage. It is likely that ranchers view the grazing fee (current 
access) as an expense to be kept as low as possible, while long-term access to public lands, 
which is what a buyout program addresses, is something different. Ranchers value grazing 
rights highly because it not only gives them the ability to graze cattle, but it enables them to 
pursue a particular lifestyle. That income was not significant in the WTA model provides 
some support for the idea that the decision to sell grazing rights is clearly more than just an 
economic one.
9 Future research is required to address this issue. 
Now consider the other explanatory variables in table 2. The significant variables are 
ranching experience, owned land, amount of public forage, and whether or not the rancher 
plans to pass the ranch to an heir. Those with more private land are less likely to accept the 
offered compensation, because they are in a better position to hold out for higher offers – 
they are better able to weather reductions in public forage, all else equal. This is not true of 
ranchers with a greater dependence on public range, as indicated by their greater willingness 
to accept a particular bid. Respondents with more ranch experience are also more willing to 
accept an offer to sell permits, perhaps because they are more knowledgeable about the 
  8future direction of livestock access to public lands or they are ready to quit the sector. What 
is surprising is that those who were more likely to pass the ranch to an heir are also more 
likely to sell grazing permits. Indeed, compared to the other variables, the ‘heir’ variable has 
the most significant impact on a respondent’s acceptance of the offered bid as determined by 
the marginal effect (see table 2). Perhaps those who had intended to pass the ranch onto an 
heir are also more willing to consider other financial ways of benefiting one’s offspring, such 
as using the money to purchase more private land. Further research into this relationship is 
also warranted. 
Also surprising is that neither our financial stress nor trust variables are statistically 
significant. A rancher who is under financial stress is not more or less likely to accept a bid 
to sell grazing permits than one who is not stressed. A possible explanation is that, because 
all ranchers in the sample rely on public land and thus most would have little wealth, the 
financial stress variable captures nothing more than feelings of optimism/pessimism. Trust 
between ranchers and public agencies does not play a role, perhaps because respondents to 
the survey realize that decisions about range use are political in nature and often outside the 
control of the public land agencies. 
Alternative Options for Compensating Nevada Ranchers 
To address the environmental concerns associated with livestock grazing, public managers 
have reduced AUMs of forage available from the land. Increased grazing fees (with greater 
flexibility to reduce stocking rates but without losing ability to utilize AUMs in the future) 
are one option for bringing about reductions in utilization of public lands by domestic 
livestock, but other options have also been suggested. To investigate some of these, the 
  9Nevada ranch survey asked respondents to consider potential means by which they might be 
‘compensated’ for a one-quarter reduction in public forage. Respondents were asked to value 
each of the following options on a likert scale of 1 (bad idea) to 5 (good idea):  
1.  “Differentiated grazing fees will be used to reward or penalize ranchers for their efforts to 
improve range quality and/or make available environmental amenities (e.g., better 
sagebrush habitat) on public land.” 
2.  Ranchers would “be allowed to collect fees for use of public lands by hunters and 
recreationists, and for providing guiding services.” 
3.  Ranchers would “be allowed to access AUMs of grazing as before, but when grazing 
permits are transferred use will be reduced.” 
Because of the likert scale, ordered-logit models are used to analyze responses. 
Ordered-Logit Model 
Ordered-logit models are used when the dependent variable is categorical and values are 
ordered. Since ranchers were asked to express their opinions using a five-point likert scale, 
an ordered-logit model can assist in determining those variables that increase our prediction 
that ranchers would see a given alternative as a good idea (positive estimated coefficient) or a 
bad one (negative coefficient). For a model with three categorical variables (or three 
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where Fε represents the logistic cumulative distribution function of the error term, x is a 
  10vector of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Again, a log-
likelihood ratio test is used to determine whether the restricted (final) regression model is 
statistically preferred to the general model that includes all of the available explanatory 
variables in table 1 that might affect the dependent variable. 
Differentiated Grazing Fees to Reward Environmental Improvements 
The mean response to this survey question was a likert score of 1.27 with a standard 
deviation of 0.78 (table 1). This suggests that respondents do not generally like this idea. The 
likert scores were regressed on the available explanatory variables, with estimation results for 
the restricted model reported in table 3.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Consider first variables that increase the chance that differentiated grazing fees are 
viewed as a good idea. As expected, those with a higher education appear more receptive to 
the use of differential grazing fees to reward environmentally sound range management 
practices. It may be that more educated ranchers feel they are better able to manage the range 
and are willing to be paid for their expertise in improving the ecosystem. Further, when trust 
between ranchers and pubic land managers increases, differentiated grazing fees have a 
higher chance of being considered a good idea. Finally, although support for differentiated 
grazing fees is also related to income and the opinion that ranchers should have more rights 
to wildlife (as expected), the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero. 
The variables that decrease the likelihood of viewing differentiated grazing fees as a 
good idea are the respondent’s age, proportion of income accounted for by off farm work, 
  11AUMs of public forage, favorable opinions regarding the role of domestic livestock in 
improving range quality and the role of ranchers in mitigating range degradation, and 
whether the rancher had disagreements with the public land agencies. However, only the 
proportion of income coming from off the ranch, amount of public forage and the opinion 
that livestock enhances range quality are statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
Those who have a higher proportion of off farm income likely have less time to spend on 
activities that enhance environmental performance, and thus are less likely to favor 
differentiated grazing fees that depend on such performance. Likewise, as the amount of 
public grazing a rancher employs goes up, the more onerous it will be for the rancher to meet 
environmental performance standards. This appears to be tempered somewhat as the size of a 
respondent’s private holdings increases in combination with higher levels of public forage, 
although the marginal impact of the cross product term in table 3 is almost insignificant. 
Finally, ranchers who view livestock grazing as already contributing to range improvements 
are less likely to think that differentiated fees related to environmental performance are 
needed, because the very activity of grazing livestock is seen to improve the environment. 
They see no need to change an existing fee system that has worked well in the past. 
An examination of the marginal effects of regressors indicates that, of the statistically 
significant explanatory variables, only educational attainment, public forage utilized, trust 
and the opinion that livestock grazing has a positive effect on range quality have a significant 
marginal impact on the idea that differentiated fees can be used to reward environmental 
performance. A one unit increase in each of these regressors results in very little change in 
the opinion ranchers hold about differentiated fees, because the marginal effects nearly offset 
one another. Unfortunately, policy cannot affect these explanatory variables in direct fashion 
  12and it is not clear how it might be done indirectly.  
Ranchers Attain the Right to Sell Non-grazing Services 
Should ranchers be allowed to collect fees for use of public lands by hunters and 
recreationists, and for providing guiding services? While some ranchers already provide 
guiding services, the idea of allowing ranchers to benefit from user fees may be beyond the 
realm of political feasibility. It is nonetheless possible to give ranchers greater property rights 
to certain environmental products of the range (namely wildlife), thereby encouraging them 
to be better public land stewards. The mean response to this idea was 2.66 with a standard 
deviation of 1.41 (table 1), suggesting that, while still a bad idea, it is considered an 
improvement over the idea of differentiated grazing fees. The results of the ordered-logit 
regression are provided in table 4. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
The rancher’s age, proportion of income coming from off the ranch, whether the 
rancher is likely to pass the ranch to an heir, trust in public land agencies, and the opinion 
that ranchers should have more rights to wildlife are all positively correlated with a 
respondent’s view that ranchers should be compensated for lost access to public forage by 
being able to collect fees from other public rangeland users. With the exception of off ranch 
income and trust, these variables are highly statistically significant (at the 5% level or better). 
Not surprisingly, the results suggest that, as ranchers get older, they appear to feel that they 
have more ‘rights’ to the public range that extend beyond their use of range for grazing their 
livestock. However, whether the respondent intends to pass the ranch onto an heir and the 
  13respondent’s strength of opinion regarding ranchers’ greater right to wildlife are statistically 
the most important explanatory variables and the ones with the greatest marginal impact on 
the preference for this form of compensation for lost forage (see table 4). Not unexpectedly, 
those intending to pass the farm to an heir and those who feel they should have greater rights 
to wildlife (perhaps because they perceive that they provide monitoring and other services as 
a result of their utilization of public range) are more favorable to the idea of benefiting from 
user fees charged non-ranch, rangeland users.  
Ranchers with higher AUMs of public forage are less likely to consider the right to 
sell the non-grazing services of the public range a good idea, perhaps because they are 
concerned about the negative impact that other users of public range might have on their own 
use, with any compensation provided insufficient to overcome the externality effects. They 
may also perceive this suggestion as an attempt to turn their operation into a ‘dude’ ranch, or 
tourist attraction, thus destroying their way of life. Again, this is tempered by the interaction 
of public forage with private landownership. In any event, the overall marginal impact of the 
public forage variable is small compared to the effects indicated above. Finally, while the 
same negative relationship holds for those with higher incomes and for ranchers who 
consider themselves to be under financial stress, neither of these regressors is statistically 
different from zero.  
Reducing Grazing upon Permit Transfer  
The final suggestion is one that allows ranchers to maintain their current AUM use, but to 
lose access to public forage when ranches are transferred. This effectively reduces the 
rancher’s wealth while maintaining current levels of use. Again, ranchers were not keen to 
see their wealth reduced and considered this option to be a rather bad idea, as indicated by a 
  14mean response on a 5-point likert scale of 2.77 with a standard deviation of 1.40. 
Nonetheless, this option was considered more favorably than the other two, if only slightly 
so. To determine which factors affect responses, an ordered logit model was estimated, with 
estimation results provided in table 5.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
With the exception of operator age and AUMs of public grazing, the explanatory 
variables in the restricted regression model all increase the likelihood that this idea is 
favorably perceived. All of the regressors are statistically significant at the 5% level or better, 
with the exception of age (7.1%) and income (11.2%). Women and more educated 
respondents are more likely to favor the idea of delaying reductions in access to public forage 
until the ranch is transferred, perhaps because these groups see the benefits of changing the 
current grazing system and thus are more open to new ideas concerning the survival of 
ranching and the political pressure to reduce livestock grazing on public lands. Gender 
appears to be more important than education (based on the relative magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients and the marginal effects), although this could be partly the result of 
gender being a dummy variable.  
Surprisingly, respondents who are more likely to pass along the ranch to an heir are 
also more likely to accept the notion of losing access to public forage at the time the ranch is 
transferred. The effect of this variable is greater than that of any other, as evidenced both by 
its marginal impact (although note the high negative marginal impacts in the strongly 
disagree and disagree categories) and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient. Perhaps 
  15respondents are discounting the future at a high rate or feel that, by dealing lost access to 
public forage, they can earn enough money to overcome the future loss of public forage.  
As trust increases, it seems reasonable that retirement of grazing rights would be 
more acceptable to ranchers as they would trust land managers to develop new programs to 
resolve range utilization conflicts. Also, as a respondent’s attitude toward the positive role of 
livestock in contributing to improved range quality increases, their acceptance of lost grazing 
services at the time a ranch is transferred also rises. This latter view is at odds with what we 
might expect, but perhaps here too the respondent is hoping that, as time passes and more 
knowledge about the usefulness of livestock grazing becomes available, the chance of losing 
access to public forage also declines.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Reduced access to public forage has had a negative financial impact on the livestock sector 
and economy of Nevada, and it has reduced social capital in the State’s ranch community 
(van Kooten et al.; Thomsen). Based on data from a survey of Nevada ranchers, the empirical 
results presented in this study indicate that the most significant variables predicting the 
possibility of accepting compensation to stop grazing on public lands, or to consider other 
means of ‘compensation’ that enable ranchers to earn a living from the public lands despite 
reduced public forage, relate to ranchers’ desires to pass on the ranch to their progeny, their 
opinion about the role of livestock grazing on the environment and gender. While the 
perceived level of trust in the public land agencies, opinion about ‘rights’ to public range, 
education, age and/or experience, financial stress, and the extent to which ranchers utilize 
public forage are statistically significant explanations of one or more compensation options, 
  16their overall importance is small in comparison. While it is not clear that AUM reductions are 
an effective method of improving range ecosystems, the expressed opposition by ranchers to 
any change in current arrangements suggests that it may be difficult to find politically 
feasible means of resolving range conflicts – making it more difficult to find acceptable 
means of compensating ranchers for lost access to public lands. This view is reinforced by 
our regression analyses that find a variety of personal and ranch characteristics, opinions, and 
other factors influencing the chances that ranchers will accept policy changes.  
In the final analysis, it appears that only large buyouts can resolve the conflict 
between the environmental or public good aspects of the public range and the perceived right 
to graze domestic livestock on public lands. In this regard, the WTA compensation 
regression results suggest that grazing permits are valued at about $255 per AUM. If this 
amount were offered to ranchers in Nevada, one would expect about half of them to accept 
the offer, thereby exhausting the $100 million budget proposed in the Voluntary Grazing 
Permit Buyout Act. Even if the federal government offered to pay ranchers across the 
western states $175 per AUM for grazing permits, it is likely that the proposed budget would 
be quickly exhausted.  
  17Notes 
1.  This view is seen, for example, in the report by Resource Concepts Inc. (2001) from 
which we take some of the information in this paragraph. 
2.  For example, more than two-thirds of the AUM reductions in Nevada were left 
unexplained, resource related (presumably to protect the range ecosystem, although this 
is not specified), or the result of permit violations. 
3.  This response rate is high compared to those of other farm surveys. A telephone survey of 
farmers conducted for the Canadian government by the Environics Research Group, for 
example, reported a response rate of 12%, about the same as that reported by Bell et al. in 
their study of farmers’ participation in Tennessee's Forest Stewardship Program. 
4.  Values are approximate because education, age, experience and income were elicited 
using categorical responses. The survey failed to elicit information on household size.  
5.  See http://www2.library.unr.edu/dataworks/NVdemog/index.htm#profiles (viewed April 
7, 2005). The Census Data do not differentiate between those living on farms and in 
towns. 
6.  U.S. Department of Agriculture data for 2004 reported by Barry Adam and viewed 1 June 
2004 at <http://www.oregonstatelands.us/rangeland_audit_response.pdf>. The disparity 
between costs of private forage in these counties is surprising. Data for Lake County (the 
county to the immediate west of Harney) were not available for reasons of 
confidentiality.  
  187.  The capitalized value is found as: ($8.83–$2.91–$1.43) per AUM divided by 0.05. The 
use of 5% is only illustrative of a reasonable real rate of return on investment, although 
Bartlett et al. find that returns to ranchers are 1-3%. The values provided here are only 
meant to be illustrative. Some range economists argue that grazing permits have value 
only because the value reflects a willingness to protect lifestyle (Bartlett et al.).  
8.  In each iteration, the variable with the least statistical significance was removed from the 
model (although both trust and income were ‘forced’ to remain in the model). This 
continued until the Wald χ
2 statistic fell below a critical significance level of 10%, in 
which case the restricted model is preferred to the general one. 
9.  Evidence from Canada’s supply managed commodities suggests that uncertainty about 
future government policy causes current use of quota to sell at prices of about one-quarter 
to one-fifth of the value of the quota, implying very high discount rates (Rick Barichello, 
pers comm, 30 April 2005). As to the insignificance of the income variable, this could 
just as well indicate that the marginal utility of income is constant, so that income enters 
the indirect utility function in linear fashion (see Hanemann). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 2002 Nevada Ranch Survey
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables         
WTA (1=yes)  238 0.0840 0.2780  0 1
Reward ranchers for environmental performance 
with differentiated fees
a  239 1.2720 0.7814 1 5
Ranchers collect fees from other rangeland users
a 238 2.6555 1.4079  1 5
AUM reductions occur only when ranch 
transferred
a  237 2.7722 1.3957 1 5
Control Variables         
Gender of respondent (1=male)  244 0.8440 0.3630  0 1
Operator age (categorical)
b 243 4.1730 1.2000  1 6
Ranching experience (categorical)
c 241 4.7260 1.3260  1 6
Operator education (categorical)
d 242 3.7850 1.7390  1 8
Income (categorical)
e 221 3.8869 1.9214  1 6
Off farm income (% of total)  243 32.6502 36.9824  0 100
Owned acres (‘000s)  244 8.9548 28.9383  0 270
AUMs of public grazing (‘000s)  240 5.0367 9.6700  0 75
Explanatory Variables         
WTA offer ($ per AUM)  238 89.9370 53.4239  5 200
Plan to pass on ranch to heir
f 244 0.2049 0.3349  0 1
Rancher under financial stress
g 238 0.9496 1.0217  -2 2
Trust public land agencies
g 241 -1.0705 1.0404  -2 2
Ranchers should have more rights to wildlife
g 241 0.5021 1.1333  -2 2
Grazing livestock enhances range quality
g 241 1.6017 0.7181  -2 2
Ranchers are the solution, not the problem, to 
range degradation
g  242 1.5289 0.7630 -2 2
Had disagreement with a public land agency 
(1=yes)  243 0.8066 0.3958 0 1
a Five categories ranging from 1=‘bad idea’ to 5= ‘great idea’. 
b Age categories: 30 or less, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 61-70 and over 70 years of age. 
c Ranching experience categories: 5 or less, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, >40 years experience. 
d Education categories: grade school, high school, some college or technical school, technical training 
in the armed forces, completed college, completed some graduate classes, completed Masters degrees, 
and completed Ph.D. 
e Income categories: < $30,000, $30-$45,000, $45,000-$60,000, $60,000-$75,000, $75,000-$90,000, 
>$90,000 
f Three responses coded as: 0 = ‘no’, ½ = ‘don’t know’, 1 = ‘yes’. 
g Categorical responses to opinion statements: -2 (‘strongly disagree’), -1 (‘disagree’), 0 (‘neutral’), 
+1 (‘agree’), +2 (‘strongly agree’)   23
Table 2: Logit Regression of Ranchers’ Willingness to Accept a 









WTA offer ($ per AUM)  0.0242
(0.000)
0.0004 






Owned acres ('000s)  -0.1810
(0.060)
-0.0034 
AUMs of public grazing ('000s)  0.2211
(0.003)
0.0040 
Plan to pass on ranch to heir  3.1666
(0.000)
0.0564 
Rancher under financial stress  -0.3548
(0.270)
-0.0061 





Log likelihood  -40.3609  
Pseudo R




Median WTA  $255.36  
a Variable descriptions are provided in Table 1. 
b Levels of statistical significance of estimated coefficients (or p-values) are 
provided in parentheses and are based on z-tests. 
c  The estimated marginal effect is simply dy/dx, or ∆y/∆x for a dummy 
explanatory variable. See Greene (pp. 815-816) for discussion of how the 
marginal effects are calculated for logit models. Marginal effects are calculated 
at means using Stata 8.0. Marginal effects can be interpreted as probabilities: 
For example, the probability that a rancher will accept a lump sum payment for 
their grazing permits increases by 5.64% if they plan to pass the ranch on to an 
heir, ceteris paribus.   24
Table 3: Ordered-logit Regression of Proposals that Nevada Ranchers be Rewarded for 
Environmental Performance using Differentiated Grazing Fees (n=211) 












e 0.0557 0.0123 0.0079  0.0084
Operator age  -0.2742 
(0.170)
0.0212 -0.0135 -0.0032 -0.0021  -0.0023
Operator education  0.2316 
(0.063)
-0.0179 0.0114 0.0027 0.0018  0.0019
Income 0.1345 
(0.270)
-0.0104 0.0066 0.0016 0.0010  0.0011




0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001  -0.0001
AUMs of public grazing  -0.145 
(0.030)
0.0112 -0.0072 -0.0017 -0.0011  -0.0012
AUMs × owned acres  0.0010 
(0.013)
-0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000
Trust public land agencies  0.3966 
(0.055)
-0.0306 0.0196 0.0047 0.0031  0.0033
Ranchers should have more 
rights to wildlife 
0.2845 
(0.191)
-0.0220 0.0140 0.0034 0.0022  0.0024




0.0453 -0.0290 -0.0069 -0.0045  -0.0049
Ranchers are the solution, 




0.0299 -0.0191 -0.0046 -0.0030  -0.0032
Had disagreement with a 
public land agency 
-0.7056 
(0.195)
0.0656 -0.0411 -0.0102 -0.0068  -0.0074
           
Boundary 1
b  -0.7517        
Boundary 2
b  0.3858        
Boundary 3
b  0.9603        
Boundary 4
b 1.6325    
Log likelihood =  -102.810    
Pseudo R
2   0.1756    
Wald χ
2  43.79 
(0.000)   
 [degrees of freedom]  [11]    
a See Table 1 for description of variables 
b These refer to the estimated boundaries between the effects reported in the last five columns. 
c Statistical significance of coefficients (p-values) are provided in parentheses, based on z-tests.  
d The estimated marginal effect is dy/dx, or ∆y/∆x for non-continuous explanatory variable. See 
Greene (pp. 876-877) for method for calculating marginal effects; here they are calculated at the 
means using Stata 8.0. Marginal effects are probabilities – e.g., the probability that a rancher strongly 
disagrees with the proposal increases by 2.12% with each increase in age category, ceteris paribus. 
e A number directly below an opinion statement, such as that below ‘strongly disagree’, refers to the 
probability that a respondent will have the indicated opinion, in this case 91.56%.   25
Table 4: Ordered-logit Regression of Proposals that Ranchers be Compensated for Lost 
Access to Public Forage by being able to Collect Fees from Other Rangeland Users in 
Nevada (n=207) 












e 0.1508 0.3569 0.1123 0.1176
Operator age  0.3120 
(0.008)
-0.0604 -0.0153 0.0204 0.0229 0.0324
Income -0.0484 
(0.488)
0.0094 0.0024 -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0050
Off farm income  
(% of total) 
0.0050 
(0.156)
-0.0010 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005




0.0108 0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0058
AUMs × owned acres  0.0003 
(0.078)
-0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000




-0.2476 -0.0626 0.0837 0.0938 0.1328




0.0391 0.0099 -0.0132 -0.0148 -0.0210




-0.0256 -0.0065 0.0087 0.0097 0.0137
Ranchers should have 
more rights to wildlife 
0.7468 
(0.000)
-0.1445 -0.0365 0.0489 0.0547 0.0775












3.3296      
         
Log likelihood =  -285.842  
Pseudo R
2   0.0925  
Wald χ
2  58.25 
(0.000)  
 [degrees of freedom]  [9]  
a See Table 1 for description of variables 
b These refer to the estimated boundaries between the effects reported in the last five columns. 
c Levels of statistical significance of estimated coefficients (or p-values) are provided in parentheses 
and are based on z-tests. 
d The estimated marginal effect is simply dy/dx, or ∆y/∆x for non-continuous explanatory variable. 
See Greene (pp. 876-877) for a discussion of how the marginal effects are to be calculated; here 
marginal effects are calculated at the means using Stata 8.0. Marginal effects are probabilities. For 
example, the probability that a rancher will strongly disagree with the proposal falls by 14.45% with 
each quantum increase in a rancher’s acceptance of the notion that ranchers should have more rights 
to wildlife, ceteris paribus. 
e A number directly below an opinion statement, such as that below ‘strongly disagree’, refers to the 
probability that a respondent will have the indicated opinion, in this case 26.24%.   26
Table 5: Ordered-logit Regression of Proposals that Reductions in Public Forage Occur 
only at Time Ranch is Transferred (n=209) 












e 0.1680 0.2961 0.2020 0.1179
Gender 0.8283 
(0.024)
-0.1625 -0.0402 0.0443 0.0893 0.0691
Operator age  -0.1968 
(0.071)
0.03333 0.0132 -0.0037 -0.0223 -0.0205
Operator education  0.1520 
(0.048)
-0.0258 -0.0102 0.0029 0.0173 0.0158
Income 0.1076 
(0.112)
-0.0182 -0.0072 0.0020 0.0122 0.0112
AUMs of public grazing  -0.0865 
(0.000)
0.0147 0.0058 -0.0016 -0.0098 -0.0090
AUMs × owned acres  0.0006 
(0.003)
-0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
Plan to pass on ranch to heir  1.0777 
(0.007)
-0.1825 -0.0724 0.0205 0.1224 0.1120
Trust public land agencies  0.4282 
(0.001)
-0.0725 -0.0288 0.0081 0.0486 0.0445




-0.1056 -0.0419 0.0119 0.0708 0.0648












3.3884   
         
Number of observations  211    
Log likelihood =  -102.810    
Pseudo R
2   0.1756    
Wald χ
2  43.79 
(0.000)   
 (degrees of freedom)  (11)    
a See Table 1 for description of variables 
b These refer to the estimated boundaries between the effects reported in the last five columns of the 
table. 
c Levels of statistical significance of estimated coefficients (or p-values) are provided in parentheses 
and are based on z-tests. 
d The estimated marginal effect is simply dy/dx, or ∆y/∆x for non-continuous explanatory variable. 
See Greene (pp. 876-877) for a discussion of how the marginal effects are to be calculated; here 
marginal effects are calculated at the means using Stata 8.0. Marginal effects are probabilities. For 
example, the probability that a rancher will strongly agree with the statement increases by 4.45% with 
each quantum increase in a rancher’s expressed trust of the public land agencies, ceteris paribus. 
e A number directly below an opinion statement, such as that below ‘strongly disagree’, refers to the 
probability that a respondent will have the indicated opinion, in this case 21.61%.  